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FOR OOCDHTE R.E;,EASE 
FROt·i THE OFFICE OF 3EJ-:ATOR MIKE ~..ANSFIF.LD (D ., Monte.:1s) 
Narch 22 , 1954 
i 
'I·ne \13.'" in Indochina is in its eighth yee:r ~ 'Il~e cffens5ve , thoagh harassed 
and str.le~-.ad, is still with ti.e Viet Minh. Expert ob3en•ers tell us tha t the 
Fre •• c!l c~::.r.not win a subztantial victor~· L"1 less t!':a:& t~.,ro years , a!'ld u!'lless 
so:nething happens to gelvanize their f:pirit an:! effo:::-t , fi!'lal military vlctcry may 
be impossible. ~'anwhile 1 the politic2l cpposltion to t~e French Go~errunent ! s 
policy i."1 Pe:Lis is growi..i(; nore veher.ent and their demands for a ce".:>3-f lre have 
rt3sul ted in the convening of the Gcr.eva Conference, 'I hey have plu~kea t'1e Kor ean 
Truce as a precedent upon wh~.oh to base their ar·Vl!J'.ents t!1P.t an armistJ.~e wit!i tt.e 
Vietmin~~ is compatible with French hc!'lor . 'l'h ' s , of course , ignores the fact that, 
the French have consistently held that the ••ar in Indoch:i.na is a 11civil in~~.:rraction• 
wh:l.;::h preclt...des UN bterference oThile the war in Korea \o.'!l.S against a recognized 
aggressor inve.dine an independent state, It is sa:.d that the French Government 
hopes t~e Genuva Conference will be a cilencer of its opposition; that the 
intransigence of the Con!lunists will ccn1ince their cour.tryn;en that thHre is no 
possible settl')ment outside of milita:::-y victory. On the ot:113r ha!'ld~ :.t may also 
happc!'l that the fail~re to bring res\:lts £rom Gensva nuy topJJle the Laniel regime , 
!'laci!'lg Mend.es-:'-ance and his group - •, ho would be pledg.Jd to ter:oir.ate the 
hostilitiez C::'\' er to the e:xter.t of wHhdr awL11g Fre:1c:1 trco:'S - b a more r.:ommanding 
position~ 
J..t th~.s date J it has not been deter:1ined whether r~prC;sentatives frora the 
Associated States will partir'ipate in Geneva. To mar.y V..let.nt~:r.ese , Ge!'leva, in its 
la::-eer measure , represents a betrayal of their nationalint nove~:ent,. Thay ask: 
1.:hat has France to give in "cive and take'' negotiations. Tl:3y e.:ts;.Jer : coJlpr oiJise 
with Ho Chi Minh by offering a coalition or partia~ recognition -- a move whereby 
those Vietnamese whose resistance has been ccnsis~ent and eotermined would be 
fatally tmdercut, 
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Jir • Pres icien t , next tton th tho l ni ted S to tcs \li 11 sit dovn vit.h C 
China , ru.d other co:..n rics ir. n conference at Ge>:.eva. The subject of tl e con-
ference pres~ubly is the c.:.tuation in Korea . There is every indication , hoY-
ever, that discus:>ion Yill focus o:i tl.e situation in lndc-Ghina . 
Tr.e Ge:1eva Ccnfer.:m-:e s t.~e re:ml t of tht> Be!'! in rrec'tinc n few vecks .. o 
c.nd ropresents the price paid t.y us for French solidarity at tle Eerlin confer-
ene;e . It see:ns b me to te a p::rti::l Soviet diplomatic victory since it \Jill , 
gc facto_, Give a deg!"ce of recocnition to the Chir.ese Corr.ounist eove::-1· cnt . 
Tbo Sc•:iet Uni0n has \-TOnted that; \.re ht.4Ve r.o• . ::r . t:clotov u::td3 it clear at 
Be::-lin that tr.e Soviet Union wanted tt:o th · ncs; U:e defeat of the Eu:·o~eo.n 
Defense Corcr:r.mi t:,r ~nd :-ecocni tion fo:- Rs:l Chin:1. 
Tl.e dec :.sion to I.eet with the Col1ll!un5.s ts in G~neva \.'OS made l y th9 adminis -
tration solel~r on its o~:n respons ibility ~ There \las no prior c0nsul taticn with 
mo:nber s on tLi:J 3ido of the aisle . And ,:\:uc:ine; by tle reaction of t;e dist ' n-
BUished majo::-i ty l~c.der , lr . l'.no\Jlo.nd, \It en he heor d the anno\•nce .ent of the 
confert:!nce , the othtJ' side of tl:e aisle r11 s t r.ave "-"so teen kept i:1 the d 'lrk . 
Be that as it may, the Uni ted S t~tes is now cor ~mit ted to a confcrenca 1,1ith 
the Ccm:r.uni sts on the Far East . '·le C"!'mot revl~:-se the d~c1sion even thoueh it 
mny not ha•1e beer! a wise one . 1:e have to m~ke the Lest of it . '!'he only Yay we 
can do so i3 to tla'{e cer ta:!.n that the free nations enter t.he coni'e.-ence \lith their 
stronccst ~cot for war d . 
SP.cretary Dulles faces , in Genevc. , ti~e most d 'fficul t tssl-: of l:is career . 
TLe Confer e'lce there n~y wall influence the outccwe of tr.e Europ~an Defense Con:-
nunity in the ncar future ~d the nat·ro of events in Asia for decades to come . 
':'he Secretary of State 1-:no\IS that ho will face da.ucerous pi tfall3 , tr.at his 
job ·Jill be extrel:lel~t celicate ar.d th' t } e will r.3ad tho creates t understanding 
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and the Greatest possible bl-partiea11 support to succeed. I \tould not le honest 
if I did not sc.y that, as an individttd Senator, I run sonel:r<J.t apprenl-,ensive 
about Geneva. I would not be honc~t, eJ.the:c, J.f I did not scy that while we 
can and sho•ll.d rais~ <;uestio:::ss offer suggest::.ons ar.d ei·Ie advice , Ye shoi..:ld 
al:.o give to our Secretc.ry of State as much encouracren.snt and s~·pport as is 
possible. 
It ha:J been ~wid many tin:ea bt•t it bears repeatincr : the only 'vtay to 
negotiate st.ccessf.U::.ly with the Comm•mists is to ne'Yotiate fror:!. strenc \1 . 
Hill tnis le the ca::>e at the coming conference in Ge!leva? IIc.s the adminis-
tr,tion exercised /.mcrican leaders rip 'vTisely to see that \:e will be na ~otiating 
fro:n stren~th? Has it made certain that the free nations uiJ.l eo into the con-
ference in uniBon o.nd at full strcneth? Or are ue drift.inrr to•11ards G~nava? 
f'lch countr~' in its o•,m wa~', uit11ot•t adequate preparation, without 11'.Lhink -thro•tgh 11 , 
without a clear- ctt sense of destination? 
As I s~id tefcre , it is too late to reverse tho decision to hold this con-
ference . It is r.ot too late, ho\v::ver , to question the preparations for it. 
And it is for this pt•rpcse that I \-tish to address myself briefly to the 
L~do-China situation . I wrmt to make certain that uith respect to this aspect 
of toe coming conference, +.he United States sees eye to e~·e with friendly 
cou.'1trieJ . I \-Ta."lt to make certain that the free nations do not abandon the 
vital peri~et~r of Sot:.theast Asia for a false peace of appeasament at ~:,eva . 
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Let r.;e r.;ake clear t~ t. I e.r.: not opposed to a pcc.ce.ful scttle=t.ent of 
thin O!' ar.y other proulet . If the conflict ir. I. de-China cru1 be brou..,ht to 
a clo:.e wit .. out surrendcri~ t! area cooner or later to totalitarian co:nr:iUnisn, 
I n. 'lll ~relccn;e :.uch a. sottler:ont . An~ one in tr.eir r.:.ght cind vould favor 
puttir.b ar. e:;d to l>loodsl.eds if it can oe aone H.:..tb:mt nppc!lseme! t of totc..li-
te.ria.nisr::, ~rithot!t los~ of freedo:-- , Hithout , ir. the lent; run jeoparrlizinG tl o 
safetj of tui::; count.ry a:;d other free natior,., . 
To achieve :mel. a. settlerr.c11t on Indo-Chin%3. at the conflJrence b.ble, 
huuever , requires the rr..arsLallin0 of the full potential of the fr~e cotmtrie: . 
It requires us, furt .. er, to :.,e prepared to carry on the strugt5le to a s:.:.~cess­
ful concluzion in tl.e event the Gor::.runists turn cio:m a just and t.onorabls 
settler ,or. t . 
A::; tl1e ~enute kllO\!S 1 I rave been deepl; interc3ted in the Indo-Chinese 
s ltu.ation for sot e tirre . I believe t!mt it is one of t!:e ke.f areas in tl1e 
defen~e of freedom in t:.e Horld . I belie•1e tLe decision as to \.tl.etl"er or not 
ue wEl bave, one do.y, to uefend our o•m sl.orcs r;,ay very \lell be rr.ado on those 
distant shoru:> . I •.:ot.J.d L~e!ri.r.d tte St:nate tbat Pe.:u-1 l.arl>o~· HilS not attacked 
until after Indo-Chir..a \·IllS firmlJ' in enc!T'y lJUiids . 
Last iull I visited t.l:e three Associated Indo-Cl'inese states of L<:tos , 
Cambodia, and Viet ! ""'m. J1.t t-!.a t.. til.e, I crossed pa.tr:s in Inaia with tl.e dis--
tb.:,-uid~ed ~jority leader \.lho I know is fully co._;nizar.t of the i. portance of 
Ir.dc--China . A few 11eeks a~o the distin"'u:.shed ma~crity lc"'-dcr a.n::i I er.tercd 
ir.to a colloqt!J on t:te floor of the Senate on this very subject. . lt H<:.S at tre 
time that tl.e Administration c.Jmounced toot $erican aviation iecL.r-.icians Here 
beint seni:. to Indo-CM: !! . If I am not m:ste.ke •• , we found ourselves in substantial 
abree:~~ .. i. . If r;;,r recollecticn is correct, ve felt that ''!cile the United ~tates 
should ~ake c. co.1t~'i'Lution to the C.efcnse of In<..c- Ci.ina, .,,e should not co::rit 
An.erican forces to the fi ..... hting the!'e . 
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I think that the distinguished majority leader would agree that three factors 
are essential if Indo-Ch;na is to be kept free of totalitarian do~ination whether 
by victory over the Communist- led forces of Ho Chi tlinh or by negotiation. First , 
the French who are making profound sacrifices in Indo-China must continue for a 
while loneer their great military effort in defense of the three Indo--Chinese states. 
And they must also continue their political effort to bring genuine na~ional 
indepe~dence to these states. Second , the Indo-Chinese nationalist leaders must be 
able to rally their people to fight for their independence against co~~unist 
domination. Third, military aid must be continued by the United States but · 
American forces must not become involved in the confljcto 
This three- pronged approach remain3 the key to a satisfactory solution of the 
Indo-China problem. It is necessary if the negotiations which are about to open 
in Geneva are to be s~ccessful. It is imperative if those negotiations fail. Un-
less it is follm.,red , we may very well have to examine the whole premise of our 
policy with respect to Indo-China$ 
Is the Administration following this three- pronged approach? Certainly, the 
administration is interested in it . But what is being done to further it? Is the 
necessary Americo.n leadership being brought to bear? Or is the Administration just 
drifting? Drifting in Indo-China and drifting towards appeasement at Geneva? 
\!e continue to receive optimistic reports from the Adltinistration about 
eventual victory in Indo-Chinao I regret to say that reports from practically every 
other source indicate a stalemate of indefinite duration in Indo-China. 
From Paris comes word that the French want to quit the struggl~, almost at 
any price. I certainly sympathize with the situation in which the French find 
themselves$ They have mado great sacrifices to prevent the Communists from 
strangling the independence of the three I:lC.o-Chinese states at birth. '!'hey are 
weary after eight long years of war. The drain of Indo- China seriouslv ~ompromises 
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tho role wr.ich the French ~ .ould be playlne in Europe . l everthelcos, tho 
continued effort of tr.e Fre:1ch in Iz.do--Cn:\.n.:J. is esoential if tl.is area in 1 ot 
to fall to the Comz::uni:::ts . Eas tl o Aclluinis tra tion r..ade clear to Fra':lce the 
vital iL.portanco of her rr:isoion to Indc- China to !.'!'ecdom? has the Acii.ur.i ::rtra-
tion done everythi~ poscible to encourage tl.e French to ccnti1ue? I believe 
it Las . 
P.e!)ort:; from Indo--C!--.ina indicate th.::t the local n!ltionalist le~:dero, 
particularly in Viet l.a~r, are not provinG very succe::;sful iu rallying tl.eir 
people to defend t:1e indupe:1denco of tr.c throe states . 1 hose report::; ir:dico.te 
that l.o Chi i·j_nh effectively co:-.cecls his ccrr.ll:uni~r .;,.n tl e clouk cf nationalism 
and re7ains tbe SJl..bol c:!: .::..nti- coloni.::..l patr.:..otism to I:Jal y inhabitants o!.' Viet. 
i.ar. • 
\!Ly is tLis U e case? Are tl.e nationulist lender::J too complacent? 
Are they r.ot sufficiently representative of their reople or responsive to their 
needs? .ihen I retur:.ed frow Iu::o--... r.d.na l<...st fall I reported on this matter to 
tr.e Sonate Fore.:.un Rel£..tions Cour.ittee in tl.e follouing terr s : 
The basic problem uhich confronts all three 
uovernmC;m,.J and parvicularly that of Vietnam 
is to put do\m firm roots in tl:.eir r€spective 
populati ons . 
I said f'..lrther tf.;B.t t!.e:;:e governrr.ents IT.ust deo.l \oJith the bcsic social 
a:1d econ0rr..ic proolt.)roS of tteir coi.illtries , tr.at tl.ey r:ust develop armed force:> 
aevoted to tLc national ir.terest a .. d that t~.ey m.:.st co;nba.t corruption. 
I wo.rr.ca , tl:.:J. t 
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failure in these basic respoPsibilities of self- government 
will result jn ~he achie7em~nt of the shadow r~ther than 
the su~stance of indepenCence . 
It could elso mean the rapid reduction o~ the three nations 
to chaos and the subsequent int7Usion of so~e new form of 
foreign domination from close at hand . 
L~ discussirg the internal situation in Indo- Ghina I co not ~jsh to indulge 
ir. persor:nlities . I have met many of the lead.ing figt:res in the governcents 
there end it would be inappropTiate for me to measure one against the other . I do 
not think it i:w.ppropriate , however , for the Adr:lini::;tration \lhich !13.s COII',.!;litted 
this country to the tune of o<er a billion dollars a year in Indo-China to look 
deeply into the inte1·nnl situation thereo Has the Ad!nL~istration sought to fjnd 
out why popular support has not gathered mo!'e effectively behind the Viet Nar.ese 
government? What doe~ the Admjnist~&tion propose to do about it? So~ethi~g 
needs to be done if "the r0sistance of the Indo- Chinese people to ccmr.1unisrn is to 
be keyed to the requ.!.rer:J.ents of the situation. 0cmething needs to b~ cone if 
local &rmies are to be trained as effective instruments of freedo~~ 
Has consic'.erat.:on been given to the possibility, by France , of issuing 
additio~al public assurances to the Indo-Chinese stetes of full independence 
within or without the French Union as a means of rellying support to the Hat i onalisi 
governoents? 
Hes coD::;ideration been given to the eppointment , by the Ur.~ted States , of 
th~ee sepacate AEbassadors to the three Associated States as n ~a7k c~ oUT co~-
f~dcnce in their future? 
Has con::;ideration been given to the use of United States technical per sonnel 
battalion coMpany , - platoon commanders to \fork under the Frenc~ high command, 
to spP.ed up the train~.ng of local troops in Ir.do-China? I u~de:tstand that a new 
French TraL~inc Co~nd has teen establi~hed ar.d that t~o United States officer s 
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have been assig~ed to that Command . This indi~ates that the F~ench reight be chang-
ing their attit'Jde in th.it> re:::p€ct . I am uot cE.ll.:.ng for thl3 despatch of frozh 
for~es from the Un)ted ~tates. But ttis countr7 already has more than 750 trnjning 
technicians on the Island of Formosa. They r.ave been trni."1ing the Chineze i.at1on-
alist armies for yearso Isn;t is possible thct at le~st a p~t of this highly-
skilled United Sta~en contingent might be reassigned to Indo- Chins? :-lculd th'Jy 
not huve a more immediate utility in the latter area? Thd Communists ccu:.u 
hardly take retaliator/ measures against tnis type of assistance 'by tho U: • .i.ted 
$t&ter ina::.much as Red China already has more than 6,000 11 ndvifers1' i~ l:ldo-China. 
':lith this kind of assistance , the Viotnc.me::;e \Jill feel, I a."U sure 1 tr.at an 
indegenous army c£J.n he trd ned j n two or three years , at r .. os t . 
It is clear to most observers \il;r.t would happen ";ere the Fron(;h to ~.eu•;e the 
sce:ne i..nrnlsdiately ~ A vacuc=J. would remil. t t·.hich the Ccmounis•.-.3 i:ould fill o'. er:lig:!t~ 
Tee above p1·oposal would requ:i re the French to remain b milj ':..e.;-y strength for two 1 
perhaps th~ee , ye&rs ur.til trajned Vietnamese could reple.ce their troops. In reply 
to such en American po3it~on , Fs.ris might "'ell ask "'hy Frencr. troops should continue 
fighting a war , ~ven for two years , if there is no pro~ise of eventual gain to the 
Frencho In reply to this , four points can be ma::1e : 
(l) The United States is most anxious to implement the French desire 
to stop the drain both on St. Cyr - the Frent;h Hest Pc_.t - and its 
traasu!'y . 
(2) A defi:1ite prv.:>osal to withdraw Frencf. fo!'ces from In~o<:hjna with:n 
o. stecifJ.ed time - already sugges'.;ed by tl:e dis "vi:- C'lishr,;d. m.?.jurity 
lec.der - \IOu:i.d tend to stabilne Frar.~e 's p~l.:tic.-=.1 sJ.tu&~io!"l a~.d 
help ~estore its position in Europe. 
(3) 
( I \ .. , 
couch a proposal would give meaning to the Frcnc!"l d<2cl.xations eb:mt 
their intent' ..ons ~_:1 reeard to -lfietne!:lese ind9~)er.denceo \L.th thnt 
kind of es::>t:rance, bo7-h po.r"vies coul:l ,.;ork !:lore ~-: el? in defining 
the ~:ench Union and there is good. reason to believe t he t Viett.am 
woulc~ oe greatly encourt.gcd to continue itJ voluTto.~y ~:;;;~cciat.:on 
with France withi~ the Unicn . 
I·ran~e has an historical obligetion toward the Assoc.:i.ctPd States • 
M "..t.~ many decades ( f colo:~ial rule , Fr!lnce could be expected · .o 
contim1e its military commitment for t..:o or three j ~a:·s so as to 
assure Vietndl:l 1s s~~cessful transition fro::. a cclory to en 
independent s~ate, 
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One of the keys to the problem of Indo-China i!. rc.any ways is the 
obscurer.css of tr.e Frencn po~i t.:.or: . J. he concept of the l'rench U1.~cn is s ~.ill 
so ruddied treat it can ncit!-1er be boUaLt nor sold . Vietmm, Laos and C~bodia 
recosnize the vulues of a continued associat!l)n with France but natural}.y •:ant 
to forge that bor.d as independent r.ations . This proposal might help cl<Jrify 
the political, as uell as the l'lilitary positior. of France . It \.JOuld certainly 
}Jelp to disavow the growing feelin~ amcng the Vietnamese a•1d other Asia1.s that 
tr.e United States is prind.pn.ll; interested in supporting .?'ranee, •1ha tcver the 
cost, instead of assisting ti.e Ir:do-Cl.5.neee peoples ln finding freedom. 
I do not knou v/hether positive rr.easures f."UCh 6.!3 I h:l.ve been discussing 
are prt:.ctical. J.'he .hdminist.ration has not tcJ{en tLe Ser.atc into its confidence 
ar.d only tLe Adz:i.nistration l.as the facts on which to base ac !:.ion. I do ::mow, 
l.o>Jevcr, that wD.e~s col:l~t:Cin.; is do.1e, tl.c free nation~ "-'lill dr·if ':. into 1-:.e 
Geneva Conference alrc:...dy defeated on tr.e Indo-Cbina qt;.estion. I do knO\I tr.at 
unless t!.cre is unity of purpose ar.d a \-lillir,gn:;ss on t11e pa.r·t of all concerned 
to make sc.crifices c..nd to rise to tl.e re:1lities of the s5.tus.tion, the or~y 
settle:T.ent which \:ill be reacLed will be a settleJLent of appeasertent . 
And if no settlement on Indo- China is achieved at. Geneva, what then? 
Is the free world co~ldemr.ed to continue indefinitely this \-lasting struggle 
in the junt)le-:; and r·ice paddies? l.:e the French to continue to lose the cream 
of their rril.i.tary f'..c.r~hood in the s>o~amps of 1:-:do-Ci:lina? Is the g:'!nuine national-
ist sentirrent •.o~hicl'~ stirs the fine people of the throe Associated Stc-.tes con-
dE:mned to bitter ancl endless frustration? Are ;te in this co'.liltry to resi.;n 
curselves to en ov.::.:v o:: a billion dollurs or n:orc over.l year over the 
indefin.:.tP futt•re to ct.ppcrt. th::.s nevcr-er.di!l~ ..-ar ir. Inclo-Chir:e.? 
riu" ~ "'"'~ "'-:>t be the result, . ':'Lere is ztill tir.c to end the drift . 
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ThEre is still tit10 , even before tho Gcr,e-:a Conference open~, to rally tl...e 
!'<Jrces of f.rceco:J to meet the situation in IY:do-Chino. . 'Here iz still limo 
to as::>~rt n positiv3, purposef'..ll leadership . There is still time, but it 
is ru.."llling ~r .. ort . ilill we rr.ake use of it before it is too lt:.to '! 
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